A war is currently going on in Cameroon, and it is obviously straining the capacity of Cross River State in Southern Nigeria to cope with the growing humanitarian crisis since the Bakassi Peninsula dispute.
Before the ownership tussle for the Peninsula, there have always been conflict-triggers on the part of Cameroon with Nigeria. Their security forces in the South-West Region have always been harassing the border communities of Akwa Ibom and Cross River states of Nigeria.
Equally, there have been secessionists ever since the Anglophone Cameroon gained independence from Britain in 1961 and voted to join in a federation with neighboring Francophone Cameroon, which had won independence from France a year earlier.
French-speaking politicians held sway in government and the promise of equality for Anglophones faded. They were forced to drive on the right hand side of the road, adopt the metric system and take on the CFA franc currency.
In 1972, President Ahmadou Ahidjo declared an end to federalism, erasing regional autonomy completely. His successor, Paul Biya, centralised things further when he came to power in 1982. He removed the second star from the national flag which represented the Anglophone regions.
The separatist movement remained on the political fringe for decades until late 2016, when English-speaking lawyers and teachers protested peacefully against having to work in French. The government cracked down hard and civilians were killed in clashes with police. The crowds grew in response, and so did the violence. In October 2017, more than 20 were killed during marches, according to Amnesty international. The military fired live rounds on protesters from helicopter gunships.
By mid-2017, many who had previously wanted just a return to federalism were calling for secession. At marches, protesters waved the blue and white flag of Ambazonia – the separatists’ proposed new state. An armed group called the Ambazonian Defence Force began attacking government soldiers in Anglophone regions.
“In 2016, people were calling for non-violence, and it was the same for most of 2017. But in 2018, people no longer see that rhetoric as holding water. They have to defend themselves,” said Tapang Ivo Tanku, an Anglophone activist based in the United States.
The formal secessionist leadership, known as the Government of Ambazonia, has distanced itself from attacks on soldiers. Its leader, Ayuk Tabe, was arrested last month in Nigeria and was deported to Yaounde. It was a symbolic blow to the movement, and Nigeria’s cooperation with Yaounde worries some separatists. But even supporters say the Ambazonian government risks irrelevance as the separatist movement takes on a life of its own.
The ADF has been joined by newer armed groups made up mostly of young men. The Vipers has claimed responsibility for burning government buildings. The Manyu Tigers says its ranks are growing and it has carried out attacks on military checkpoints. “There are hundreds of us, but we are aiming for 2,000-3,000. We want to start attacking wholesale,” said the group’s financial director, Ambe Simon, in a telephone interview. “We are receiving money from all over the world. We have $50,000 at the moment. We are getting weapons from the black market.”
Faced with this threat, the Cameroonian military last December fanned out into the villages among the cocoa farms and forests near the Nigerian border that have become the separatists’ stronghold. More than 40,000 have since fled to Nigeria, according to the United Nations, and most villages are deserted. Communications are slow in the rural areas and the internet is frequently shut off, but interviews with residents reveal what they were fleeing from.
“All my effects were in that house. There was my daughter’s sewing machine, her clothes. Our whole life was in that house,” he told Reuters during an interview in a church in a nearby town where he has sought shelter. On January 14, soldiers entered the village of KwaKwa, a few kilometers from Bole, looking for information about a soldier killed there. Villagers fled to nearby cocoa farms as the soldiers opened fire.
A resident named Alex returned under cover of darkness the following evening to assess the damage: most of KwaKwa’s wooden houses were burned to ash and dead bodies lay in the street. He helped bury more than ten bodies behind a burned-out house. His account was corroborated by two other residents.“Everybody was running in all directions,” Alex said in a telephone interview. “Things are not going well. We are in a war.”
With the war raging, fact is, the Bakassi conflict still leave many knotty issues unresolved till date in spite of the judgment of the International Court of Justice in 2005. Many years after the judgment, the frantic resolution efforts by both Nigeria and Cameroon seems to have been hinged on a faulty foundation, and the knotty issues earlier undermined by all the parties in the dispute (Nigeria, Cameroon and the International Court of Justice) appear to have resurfaced.
The protracted Bakassi conflict can be blamed on the nature and a not too dynamic pattern of Nigeria foreign Policy, especially the failure of the country‘s foreign policy to adequately articulate the country’s strategic national interest. These short-comings have been treated by diplomants and scholars such as Ibrahim Gambari, Chritopher Kolade, Joy Ogwu, Akinjide O.Ronke O., Asisi A., Bamidele K., Fred A., Allison a. Ayida, Akinterinwa and Bassey Ate among others. Such knotty issues could be traced the following strand of issues.
First, the position of the country in respite of the doctrine of Uti Possidetis and other boundary related issues such as boundary treaties bequeathed Africa from her colonial masters; turn out to be her nemesis on the dispute.
The ICJ’s verdict is that the colonial treaties in respect of southern and northern border respectively were valid legal evidence. In the same vein, the court ruled that the agreements between Nigerian and Cameroon in 1971 and 1975 are also valid legal evidences.
According to ICJ, this treaties or agreement, establishes legal rights of sovereignty, to each disputing parties over parts of the territories in dispute and serves as a profound basis for defining and demarcating the contentious peninsula.
Why did Cameroon flagrantly violate the Principle of African Continental Jurisdiction which emphasizes intra-Africa solution to disputes in Africa by rushing to the International Court of Justice? What are underlying role of France in the Bakassi Conflict?
Bearing in mind that the litigation and the resultant judgment that cropped up at a time when a French man headed the International Court of Justice.
Thirdly, why is it that the nation’s foreign policy was not positively responsive to glaring inadequacies from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, considering the political, social humanitarian and economic implications of the International Court of Justice judgment?
Bakassi Peninsula
The nation’s foreign policy has been inconsistent, contradictory and sheer myopic in view of the Bakassi conflict as it affects the country’s strategic interest. The Nigeria foreign policy did not anticipate the Bakassi conflicts in respect of ratification of various instruments. At the start of legal hostilities, the foreign policy did not take seriously, concerns over the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s jurisdiction to adjudicate such issue before going to The Hague.
The country initially questioned the jurisdiction but later accept same. The country leaders failed to examine the strategic implication and dimension of going to the International Court of Justice until the judgment was being reeled out.
The Nigeria government initially rejected the questionable ruling of the ICJ. This was accepted by many scholars and diplomats. Nonetheless, while they were busy doling out justifications for the rejection of the ICJ’s ruling, the government made an apparent u-turn– accepting the judgment. This smacks foreign policy inconsistency.
Cameroon appears to have articulated her national interest more Nigeria’s, showing more consistency in its approach to the Bakassi dispute. In view of this fact, Cameroon ratified the Vienna Conventions on Law of Treaties in 1991 and accepting the International Court of Justice compulsory jurisdiction in 1994, in anticipation of her litigation.
And waited till a French man heads the ICJ before striking. By undermining bilateral resolution mechanism, ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, African Union (A.U) Machinery for Conflict Prevention, African Union (A.U) Court of Justice and the Commission for Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration, Cameroon vehemently undermined Pax Africana Resolution of disputes in Africa.
Besides, Nigerian government adoption of the Anglo-German Treaty of 11th March 1913, Gowon ratification of the Maruoa Declaration on June 1,1975, many top government officials, leaders and Nigerian diplomats issued out statements, letters, maps and presentations that obviously were in contradiction to Nigeria’s Bakassi presentations at the ICJ, showing a trail of foreign policy inconsistencies.
It should be noted that throughout the presentation at Hague, both countries were mainly concerned about their economic interest in Bakassi, rather than concern for human welfare of the Bakassi natives, though this belies their stance as even common with most international conflicts. Even when other interests or motives are presented as issues in disputes often, though not always, the underlying rationale is national resources.
In the Bakassi context, it was the discovery of crude oil in the disputed territory in 1967 that heightened the interests of Nigeria and Cameroon peninsula. This explains why the Nigerian government readily accepted the result of the referendum in Southern Cameroon in 1961, but rejected the verdict of the ICJ in 2002; even it secured a substantial territory and gained some people from Cameroon.
Historically, it is clear that there is a link between repressive regimes and their disposition of Nigeria foreign policy that produce undiplomatic actions in the Bakassi conflict. There were more diplomatic measures taken to resolve the dispute during civilian reign than during military regimes.
Second, both Nigeria and Cameroon were only engulfed in the conflict due to economic stakes and not mere territorial concerns, thus undermining the Bakassi natives in the conflict. Third, Nigeria failed to avoid the litigation, which it could have done and perhaps opt and for a political solution in view of Pan African approach to disputes in Africa. Nigeria has failed to evaluate and react to the underlying interests of France in the dispute as well as other parties urging her to accept or reject the ICJ’s ruling.
From the pre-ICJ’s judgment to the post-ICJ’s judgment eras of the dispute, it is obvious that the interest of the people living in the area were never really taken into consideration, by both contending parties. Neither party provided social amenities or any form of development for the Bakassi people despite the prospects the area possesses.
While the ICJ failed to accord the Bakassi people their right to self determination. This has left the Bakassi people with so much chagrin over the judgment. Apparently, there are pockets of evidence to show that even the Green Tree Treaty resolution of the dispute has failed abysmally to cater for the interests of the Bakassi natives who have been victimized and deprived by the prolonged conflict and the attendant flawed ICJ’s ruling.
In considering Nigeria foreign policy from the post –ICJ’s judgment era, it was revealed that reactions on the part of government and individuals was mixed, while some called for a defiance of the ICJ ruling, others call for an outright compliance with the ruling due to the nation’s international commitments. It should be noted that there are numerous instances where nations have blatantly undermined or disregarded the rulings of the ICJ, though this comes with some consequences of sanctions.
Of the over 70 disputes ruled by ICJ, about 60 of such were later handled bilaterally between disputing parties for proper resolution. This is often resolved through further concession on the part of the victorious party in the dispute. This is based on the fact that the ICJ’s ruling has always include provisions urging disputing parties to return to negotiation table even after the ruling, for amicable resolution of disputes. As the deadline for appeal of the ICJ’s ruling looms, Nigeria has no option than to appeal, giving the weight of evidence now at her disposal and the renewed articulation of her foreign policy, which hitherto was chequered and inconsistent.
When this fails, the country can then result to diplomatic bargaining for Cameroon to make further concession, especially a concession that will take the utilitarian interests of the Bakassi people into consideration. Humanitarian concerns should supersede economic and political tussles in all fairness. Currently, there seems to be unison among Nigerians, her leaders, diplomats and scholars that the ICJ’s ruling is flawed and need to be redressed.
The Bakassi conflict brought to the front burner, Cameroon’s antagonistic tendencies despite the good brother posturing of Nigeria. In line with her posturing, Nigeria very recently broke ranks with the Anglophone bloc to support Issa Hayatou of Cameroon for the Confederation of African Football (CAF) presidency.
Nigeria accepted the 2002 resolution of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Bakassi in good faith, yet Cameroon has been confrontational, under the pretext of the security challenges posed by the cross-border terror activities of Boko Haram, to be abusing Nigerians.
Consequently, scores of Nigerians are dying in suspicious circumstances in Cameroonian prisons. This has been happening in spite of frequent protestations by the Nigerian diplomatic and consular missions.
Nigeria has been requesting Cameroon to inform her of all arrests of her nationals. But the host security authorities ‘’rarely conform to this international best practice,’’ a diplomat told The Investigator Nigeria.
There are more than four million Nigerians resident in Cameroon. The vast majority of them are in the informal sectors scattered all over the 10 regions of their host country. There are also a few in the international organizations, oil and gas as well as the service sectors.
The most common consular problems the itinerant Nigerian traders are facing are related to the issues of regularisation of their immigration status. Nigerians are complaining bitterly about high costs of Residence Permit and Business Licenses, indiscriminate taxation/levies, constant harassment, intimidation and brutalization by Cameroonian security agents.
Nigeria’s diplomatic/consular missions are, however, aware that Nigerians often face ‘’arbitrary arrests’’ over minor offences at checkpoints and at airports.
Sources say there are many Nigerians in Cameroonian prisons, who have been there without proper trial. Some are said to be subjected to trial in military tribunals, which are not only very slow but are not subjected to a best legal practice.
The most common criminal offences committed by Nigerians generally are drug trafficking, theft, rape, piracy, violation of immigration laws and tax evasion.
Human rights activists, however, say Cameroonian prisons are underfunded and are well known for their ill-treatment of inmates, who are poorly fed and hardly receive proper medical attention for health problems.
Activists are concerned that with the situation, there is a need for reform. Security agents allegedly use every excuse to apprehend Nigerians including accusing them for ‘’illegal entry’’, even when in possession of valid documents with entry stamps from the appropriate Cameroonian authorities.
“We have had reports of Nigerians being asked to show entry visas’’, an official said. But, going by the 1963 Protocol on Free Movement of Goods and Persons signed by both countries, Nigerians do not require a visa to enter Cameroon.
Diplomats are, however, arguing that the Protocol is outdated and due for a review as agreed by both countries at the Sixth Session of the Nigeria/Cameroon Joint Commission in 2014. The matter featured prominently during President Muhammadu Buhari’s visit to Cameroon in July 2015 and during President Paul Biya’s visit to Nigeria in May 2016.
Officials of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city, say President Buhari’s administration has agreed to convene the first review meeting, but there is no positive response yet from Cameroon
Concerned insiders are pushing for the Nigeria Immigration Service to come up with plans for the critical meeting since Nigeria stands to gain more in the interest of protecting her citizens and catering for their welfare in Cameroon.
