Ibom Deep Seaport: Not Pessimism, but Reality

Okon Nnaetuk

At the Godswill Akpabio International Stadium, Uyo, on Friday, November 6, 2026, Governor Umo Eno, had appealed to President Tinubu: “Approve Ibom Deep Seaport.” In a dramatic exchange, Tinubu turned to the crowd and asked: “Will you vote?” The crowd roared: “Yes!”

“Okay, it’s approved,” the President responded.

The exchange was entertaining and therapeutic, but it raised questions about the substance of the announcement. Was this a carefully considered executive decision, impulsive policy statement or a spontaneous political response to please enthusiastic crowd?

While newspaper headlines screamed, “Tinubu Approves Ibom Deep Seaport,” and residents celebrated, a crucial fact was largely overlooked: This was the third presidential approval of the much-touted project in modern Nigerian history.

Three presidents. Three approvals. Fourteen years. Not a single container ship has berthed.

The first presidential endorsement came on September 18, 2012, when former President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated the Federal Government Project Development Committee for the Ibaka Deep Seaport. Yet, by the time he left office, the project had barely moved beyond its embryonic stage.

Eight years later, the late President Muhammadu Buhari announced another approval at the Federal Executive Council meeting on December 16, 2020. The project was assigned an estimated $2.016 billion for its first phase, with Bolloré/PowerChina emerging as preferred bidders.

Again, there was applause and optimism. But the project failed to move from planning to construction.

Now, President Tinubu has announced another approval. The question is no longer whether successive presidents have approved the project. It is whether the approvals will ever translate into a functioning seaport.

The state government must demonstrate how it intends to execute a project that requires enormous capital, credible investors, financiers and international partners.

Is the government adequately prepared to execute the project, even if investors eventually show interest?

Professor Hilary Inyang, a former US Ambassador’s scholar to Ethiopia and Chairman of the Akwa Ibom Think-Tank on Education, reportedly spoke about a consortium’s plan to invest $8 billion in the project during an Open Forum radio interview. Yet, there appears to be no concrete engagement between the state government and the consortium.

It is unrealistic to expect the state government to single-handedly finance and construct a deep seaport of this magnitude.

One of the biggest obstacles is securing the enormous funding required. The total project cost is estimated at between $4.6 billion and $5 billion, while the first phase alone is projected to gulp $2.016 billion. Today, the sun is untenable due to fluid inflation in the country.

Under the financing arrangement approved in 2020, private investors are expected to provide 60 per cent of the funding, while the public sector contributes 40 per cent.

This translates to approximately $1.209 billion from private investors and $806 million from the public sector, comprising the Federal Government and Akwa Ibom State.

The figures are staggering. Akwa Ibom’s entire annual budget is considerably smaller than the amount required for the public sector’s contribution. For instance, the state is projecting a budget of about N1.2 trillion for capital and recurrent expenditures in 2027 financial year.

Committing such enormous resources to a single project would place considerable pressure on the state’s finances, particularly when other sectors also require substantial investment.

This is not pessimism, but fiscal reality.

Governor Eno subsequently clarified in a broadcast that “approval is not the same as approval to commence construction.” According to him, the approval concerned memoranda intended to enable the Federal Government to provide a sovereign guarantee to attract investors. That clarification is important.

An approval announced at a stadium does not constitute a seaport. A functioning seaport requires concrete infrastructure, cargo-handling equipment, cranes, access channels and supporting facilities.

Akwa Ibom has witnessed presidential approvals. What it needs now is construction. In April 2026, Governor Eno received the comprehensive feasibility report for the project. Geotechnical surveys are ongoing, access roads are under construction, and a project office has been established. These are encouraging developments.

However, on October 19, 2026, the Commissioner for Finance/Special Duties, Emem Bob, acknowledged in Uyo that insufficient investor interest was delaying the project’s take-off. That admission underscores the magnitude of the challenge.

Beyond financing, another problem threatening the project is the absence of consensus among the state’s various ethnic and political interests over its location and identity.

Akwa Ibom is not a homogeneous political or cultural bloc. It comprises Ibibio, Annang, Oro, Ibeno, Eket and other tribal communities, each with its own interests and expectations. Unfortunately, they do not appear to share a common position on the seaport.

The Oro people insist that the project was originally conceived by former Governor Victor Attah in 1999 as the Ibaka Deep Seaport, to be located in Ibaka, Mbo Local Government Area.

They argue that Oro contributes substantially to Akwa Ibom’s oil wealth but feels marginalised in the handling of the project.

Their position is that Ibaka offers naturally deep waters, reportedly between 17.5 and 18 metres, reducing or eliminating the need for expensive dredging. Their argument is simple: Why abandon Ibaka when nature has already provided the necessary maritime advantage?

However, the Ibeno/Eket interests and the administration of former Governor Udom Emmanuel maintained a different position. They argued that consultants had identified limitations with the original Ibaka location, including its distance from the open sea and questions about its commercial viability.

Consequently, they favoured a seaside location around Unyenge/Okposo, spanning Mbo and Ibeno, and adopted the name Ibom Deep Seaport to reflect the project’s statewide identity rather than its association with a particular community.

The disagreement has now assumed another political dimension. In November 2026, the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) governorship candidate in Akwa Ibom, Michael Enyong, declared that he would return the project to Ibaka within 90 days, if elected governor in 2027.

He argued that the Ibeno location was too shallow and would require expensive dredging, potentially discouraging investors.

Michael Bush, the Labour Party governorship candidate, has also aligned himself with the agitation, promising to retain the name Ibaka Deep Seaport if elected.

Clearly, the controversy is no longer just about engineering or commercial viability. It has become a political contest over location, identity and ownership.

But what are the implications for investors?

Every change in location or project identity potentially triggers fresh administrative, regulatory and financial considerations.

The Federal Executive Council memorandum may require amendment. The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) documentation may need adjustments. Environmental approvals may have to be reviewed, while investors and financial institutions would need clarity on the project’s final configuration.

A financier in Paris, Beijing or Singapore does not commit billions of dollars to a project surrounded by uncertainty. When investors see Akwa Ibom divided over Ibaka and Ibeno, they may simply look elsewhere.

They could choose Lagos, Badagry or Ogun State, where competing deep-seaport projects are also seeking investment.

Ogun State, for instance, has moved ahead with its Gateway Deep Sea Port partnership with DP World.

The reality is that international investors have choices. They will naturally favour projects with clearer ownership structures, regulatory certainty and political continuity.

Ironically, both the proposed Ibaka and seaside locations are within the broader Mbo/Ibeno coastal corridor. Yet, more than two decades after the project was conceived, political and communal disagreements continue to threaten its progress.

Meanwhile, Lekki Deep Seaport in Lagos has become operational, while other competing port projects are advancing.

This was the concern behind the September 28, 2026, intervention by Mboho Mkparawa Ibibio, which cautioned the Federal Government against turning the Ibom Deep Seaport into another election-season promise.

The trajectory of the project is also littered with prospective investors and preferred bidders whose interests have failed to translate into construction.

Bolloré/PowerChina emerged as preferred bidders in 2020, but the arrangement did not progress to implementation.

Africa Global Logistics (AGL), the successor to Bolloré Africa, subsequently met with Governor Eno in Paris in June 2026.

Although the company reportedly expressed interest in the project, expressions of interest are not the same as financial commitments.

Investors must move beyond meetings, presentations and promises to concrete financial agreements.

More importantly, the Federal Government is yet to provide the sovereign guarantee required to reassure potential financiers. This is arguably one of the most critical components of the project.

Without a credible sovereign guarantee, international financial institutions may be reluctant to lend more than $1 billion to a port project whose political and administrative future remains uncertain.

Their concerns are understandable. What happens if a succeeding President or governor abandons the project? What happens if another administration changes its location, ownership structure or concession arrangement? Who assumes responsibility for the outstanding financial obligations?

A sovereign guarantee provides an important layer of assurance by committing the Federal Government to specified financial obligations under agreed conditions. Tinubu’s November 6 approval was reportedly connected to this arrangement.

However, the details, including the financial exposure, terms and implementation timeline, were not clearly disclosed in Governor Eno’s subsequent broadcast.

These are the details investors need, not applause at a political rally. The competition is also becoming fiercer.

Ogun State is pursuing its Gateway Deep Sea Port partnership with DP World. Lagos already has Lekki Deep Seaport, while Badagry is attracting the attention of major port operators, including interests associated with APM Terminals/Maersk.

International investors have limited resources and multiple investment destinations.

Why should they commit billions of dollars to a project plagued by political disagreements when alternative locations offer greater certainty?

Akwa Ibom must move beyond presidential announcements and political declarations to address the fundamental issues threatening the project.

First, the government must establish a legally recognised and technically defensible location for the seaport. The decision must be based on credible feasibility studies, engineering considerations and commercial viability, not ethnic sentiments or political calculations.

Once established, the location must be gazetted and protected against unnecessary changes whenever a new administration assumes office.

Second, the Federal Government must provide a clearly documented sovereign guarantee. Investors and financial institutions need to know the precise financial commitments, conditions and timelines involved.

A bank does not lend billions of dollars on the strength of “Okay, it’s approved.” It lends on legally enforceable agreements and credible financial guarantees.

Third, the state must demonstrate the project’s economic viability beyond its maritime facilities.

A seaport without efficient road and rail connections to major commercial centres such as Aba, Onitsha and Abuja risks becoming an expensive white elephant.

Investors will naturally ask: If a container ship berths at Ibaka, how efficiently will its cargo reach Onitsha, Aba or other inland markets?

Without an efficient transportation network, the commercial justification for the port becomes questionable.

Finally, the project requires political continuity and institutional protection. It must be insulated from the whims of successive administrations and the temptation by individual governors to rewrite its history.

In reality, a succeeding administration could introduce fresh proposals or seek amendments. That possibility makes a legally binding framework even more necessary.

History provides sufficient evidence of the project’s political journey.

Former Governor Victor Attah conceived the Ibaka Deep Seaport. Former Governor Godswill Akpabio engaged Felak Concepts to develop its design. Former Governor Udom Emmanuel moved the proposed location towards the seaside and renamed it Ibom Deep Seaport.

Governor Umo Eno is now pursuing access roads, engaging prospective investors and seeking Federal Government support.

Meanwhile, Enyong has promised to return the project to Ibaka within 90 days if elected governor in 2027. Also, Bush pledged to retain it’s former name. Different persons, different strokes.

Each administration appears determined to leave its own imprint on the project. Unfortunately, the tendency to review, rename or relocate it risks resetting the process every time political power changes hands.

A deep seaport is a long-term infrastructure investment that could take a decade or more to complete.

No single governor can reasonably claim exclusive ownership of such a project owing to a short spell of eight years.

What Akwa Ibom needs is a framework that guarantees continuity across administrations, political parties and changes in leadership. The location, concession arrangements, financing structure and implementation commitments must be protected by credible institutional and legal safeguards.

The Ibom Deep Seaport must be bigger than any governor, political party, ethnic group or election cycle.

Until the Federal Government and relevant Nigerian institutions demonstrate definite political will, administrative consistency and institutional sincerity required to move beyond ceremonial approvals, the project risks remaining what it has been for more than two decades: a grand promise trapped in Nigeria’s narrow politics of ethnicity, patronage and political succession.